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COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRACY: SYRACUSE 
REFLECTIONS 
Richard E.D. Schwartz* 
The articles in this issue of the Syracuse Journal of International 
Law and Commerce were prepared for a Conference held at Syracuse 
University College of Law on April 16-17, 2005. With the generous 
support of Dean Hannah Arterian, of the Syracuse University's College 
of Law, we brought together forty people to address the topic "Legal 
Evolution: Toward a World Rule of Law." The editors have asked me to 
write the foreword to this symposium issue. 
The articles speak for themselves. They represent scholarly 
responses to the question, "How does the American experience with 
democracy contribute to our understanding of the prospects for, and 
paths to, democracy worldwide?" Another half of the papers prepared 
for the Conference deal with the experience of other countries, many of 
them moving toward rule-of-law democracy. 1 Taken together, they 
represent a sample of our present knowledge-and they suggest new 
directions for future research. 
The Conference in Syracuse underlined for me the significance of 
community as a basis for democracy. This foreword to the Symposium 
gives me the chance to jot down and share some thoughts along those 
lines. My thesis is that communities with certain qualities contribute to 
the development and sustaining of democracy. The qualities to which I 
refer include: mutual respect across lines of division and the creative 
composition of differences. 
At Syracuse, we saw two kinds of community: local and scholarly. 
Within the large community of greater Syracuse, there are many smaller 
communities that also foster mutual understanding and joint effort. 
People in this area have formed many different kinds of groups that 
cross lines of division, search for common ground, and frequently 
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succeed in finding it. Many of these are informal and casual, but several 
have regular meetings, agendas, and programs. Size is a major factor in 
determining how these groups operate. In the first part of this foreword, 
I will give some examples of how this type of local community works. 
The second type of community, also evident at the Conference, is 
the community of socio-legal scholars. They assembled at Syracuse as a 
group interested in the potential for worldwide proliferation of rule-of-
law democracy. They shared a common culture in which factual 
information is formally presented and analyzed. They considered the 
topic of change toward (or away from) rule-of-law democracy in several 
countries and exchanged views as to the factors contributing to such 
change. They differed on a variety of issues-among them, the value of 
"evolution" as a concept in analyzing socio-legal change, but 
differences of this kind were handled with civility and a tacit 
commitment to understand opposing positions.2 
Both types of community can tell us something about how 
democracy works. When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his remarkable 
study of Democracy in America, 3 he emphasized the significance of 
local groups in America-in contrast with France where, he thought, 
democracy suffered from the scarcity of such groups. The tendency of 
Americans to be joiners has continued from then until now. 
The scholarly socio-legal community can also tell us something 
about how democracy works. Its method of doing so, however, is very 
different from community at the local level. It seeks to discern through 
analysis and observation what is happening in America and in other 
countries that relates to the growth or decline of democratic governance. 
On the basis of such observations, differences can be identified and 
sometimes resolved. 
Between these two types of community there are differences of 
qualification, status, knowledge, and style. Local communities tend to 
welcome volunteers, to vary from one group to another in social status, 
to rely more on common sense than systematic book learning, and to 
cultivate informality. Scholarly communities differ from the local 
communities in all of these regards. 
My main purpose in noting the contrast is to suggest that the 
involvement of both types of community can strengthen democratic 
values. When local communities overcome prevailing differences, when 
2. Richard E.D. Schwartz, Socio/ega/ Evolution: An Introduction, 603 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 8 (2006). 
3. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835). 
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they cultivate civility and mutual understanding across traditional lines 
of isolation or hostility, their interaction can strengthen the commitment 
to a functioning democracy. We need to know much more than we now 
do as to when and whether that proposition is true. If it is sometimes the 
case, then the cultivation of community involvement at the local level 
could lead to stronger democracy. 4 
How does this thesis relate to rule-of-law democracy in other 
countries? A sense of national community seems essential if democracy 
is to flourish. Nation states can be tom apart if the differences among 
segments of their populations become excessive. Or such differences 
can lead to the establishment of authoritarian governments that use the 
power of the state to suppress dissident segments of the population. 
Examples of both such processes are found in Iraq. The separatism of 
the Kurds led to radical suppression by Saddam Hussein. Since 
Saddam's fall, the dissidence of the Sunnis now appears to block the 
emergence of a functioning democratic nation. 
In America, such extremes do not imminently threaten the 
Republic. Yet the challenge posed by terrorism could dramatically 
threaten the stability of our social order. To secure the advantages of 
true democracy in a troubled world, we should search for ways of 
strengthening the culture that supports it. A healthy practice of 
community participation can strengthen the body politic-as physical 
exercise strengthens the individual body. 
All of this is speculation, to be sure. Even communitarian literature 
has not yet included substantial empirical research that goes beyond 
illustration. 5 What we have so far are interesting examples and 
specialized studies. Much more scholarship is needed to expand our 
knowledge of the relation between community and democracy-in this 
country and in other places where democracy exists or where its 
development is to be encouraged. 
What I would like to do in this introduction is to illustrate 
communities at work. This is not the place to report a study of 
community in Syracuse, or any other locality. Nor is it the place to 
record or develop research and theoretical ideas on the relation of 
community to democracy. All I can do here is to register some 
4. See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICPATORY POLITICS 
FOR A NEW AGE (1984). 
5. See generally AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: THE REIVENTION OF 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993); see also AMITAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNITY: A NEW 
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2004); See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, THE 
MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992); see 
also PHILIP SELZNICK, THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSUASION (2002). 
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impressions stimulated by both types of community at the Syracuse 
Conference in mid-April, 2005. 
LOCAL COMMUNITY: SOME EXAMPLES FROM SYRACUSE 
When Dean Arterian invited me to prepare a Conference on a 
subject of my choosing, she also arranged and supported a dinner to 
which she suggested that I invite people I had known in the community. 
This was a delightful part of the preparation for the Conference, since so 
many people from the local community could join with the Conference 
participants in a kind of testimonial dinner. I am not one to enjoy being 
"honored"-not that I have had many such occasions-but it was 
wonderful to see all of these folks at one time. Many had become 
friends in the course of our living, working, and playing together during 
the twenty-five years that we-my wonderful wife, Emilie, and I-lived 
there. 
That dinner in some way summed up for me the value of a 
functioning community. It reminded me of the personal satisfactions of 
meeting people from different backgrounds-and the importance of 
those interactions that we summarize (often too glibly) as community. 
When these interrelationships lead to positive results, one realizes more 
clearly how vital such contacts can be. Multiplied many times they can 
provide an important component for a functioning democracy. 
I learned a lot about the local community from my twenty-five 
years in Syracuse. In both the University and in greater Syracuse there 
was a spirit of creative compromise that enhanced one's understanding 
of other points of view and strengthened people's capacity to work 
together toward shared goals. 
In the University, I had the great good fortune of working with the 
late Melvin Eggers on a plan regarding the future of the University. 
Chancellor Eggers was a very shy man, who did not like to impose his 
views on the faculty-except when he was convinced that it was 
fundamentally necessary for the future of the University. Mel Eggers 
understood and practiced ways of satisfying multiple needs through 
creative compromise. He made it clear that he valued citizenship within 
the University-and beyond. That attitude encouraged me to work with 
Syracusans, in a number of settings. 
As I reflect on the years spent in Syracuse, one feature of the 
community stands out. It is a place where the active citizens know each 
other and relate in a mutually understandable and often highly 
beneficial way. There are many communities where this is the case, but 
there are others where it is not. There are still many places in America 
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where some categories of people are totally excluded from "the action" 
because of factors that should be irrelevant, such as religion, race, class, 
and ethnicity. I did not see such total exclusion in Syracuse. 
The community is, to be sure, far from being perfectly inclusive. It 
is no utopia. There are, however, trends that move toward stronger, 
more inclusive community. There are many occasions when people in 
Syracuse get together-across lines of religion, class, race, and 
ethnicity-to share and to help in one way or another. Many such 
activities become organized, with regular meetings, officers, and 
budgets. That is a tendency of successful efforts that start informally. 
Maintaining the qualities of informality as organizations grow is 
difficult but not impossible. Syracuse has a good record on that score. 
Describing the community organizations of Syracuse, or 
systematically sampling them, would be a monumental (though 
worthwhile) task. Celebrating them is another matter. They deserve to 
be praised in the present context, not only for the good work they do, 
but also because they illustrate the kind of community culture needed to 
support strong democracy. 
The basic idea of democracy, distinguishing it from authoritarian 
modes of governance, is that ordinary people have a say in how the 
society functions. Voting alone is not enough to maintain a strong 
democracy. If people were to vote solely according to their own 
individual interests, caring nothing for the general welfare, the capacity 
of the society to hold together and to meet the most urgent legitimate 
needs of its citizens would be jeopardized. As Robert Post points out, 
mediating between individual needs and collective responsibilities is a 
fundamental task of effective democracy.6 For that mediation to be 
understood, appreciated, and acted on is one of the central requirements 
for a democratic culture. And it is that job that can most effectively be 
done at the community level. Syracuse has many examples that 
illustrate that spirit of community. One example is the Syracuse Area 
Middle East Dialogue (SAMED). 
In 1979, a group of six people interested in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict met in Syracuse to form a discussion group that might agree on 
a position regarding that long-enduring conflict. The six included two 
Arabs; two Jews; and two "Others." Some such group had existed 
earlier, but had not continued meeting. 
Agreeing on procedures and goals, the planning group set about 
6. Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 24-
36 (2006). 
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filling five additional places for each side. That effort turned out to be 
difficult for each of the categories. Jews who joined risked 
condemnation as being unduly friendly with, or sympathetic to, the 
Palestinians. Finding Palestinians willing to be identified as such proved 
difficult, because they feared prejudice. It was safer to be identified as 
"from the Middle East," or better still to be seen as undifferentiated 
Americans. As for the "Others," only a few overcame the response 
heard frequently that "We have enough problems here at home. Besides, 
what good could we do?"7 
Eventually, the group reached its goal of twenty-one, and regular 
meetings began. Deliberations were understood to be private. Public 
statements were seldom issued, and these were approved after much 
deliberation. In the early years, a doctoral candidate at the University's 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs volunteered to take 
detailed notes. These were summarized in a dissertation that treated as 
confidential not only the identity of the participants, but the community 
as well.8 
That study gives a detailed account of interactions among the 
participants, and other materials substantiate that picture. It proved 
difficult to overcome the antagonism generated by the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Hard-liners, if not also typical mainstream members, on 
both sides were outraged at the very idea that there could be merit on 
the other side. Within the group there was plenty of disagreement-but 
it could be overcome through regular meetings in which open 
discussion of differences became the norm. 
One reason this worked was due to the resignation of one or two in 
each category who had a belly full. The "last straw" varied from one 
departing member to another. One Jewish member resigned in 
disappointment on discovering that he could not convert the group to his 
view that Israel had "every right" to the land between the Jordan River 
and the Mediterranean Sea. A Palestinian member struggled openly 
with ambivalence and finally resigned with the observation that the 
group described the conflict as Israeli-Palestinian, rather than as 
Palestinian-Israeli. And an "Other" member finally gave up when 
SAMED was unable to move quickly enough toward support of a two-
7. See RICHARD E .D. SCHWARTZ, ARAB-JEWISH DIALOGUE IN THE UNITED STATES: 
TOWARD TRACK II TRACTABILITY in INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 
180-209 (1989). 
8. Amy S. Hubbard, Cross-Culture Conflict Resolution Group: American Palestinians 
and Jews in Dialogue on the Middle East (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse 
University) (on file with the Syracuse University Library). 
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state solution. 
Those who remained continued to try to understand, intellectually 
and emotionally, the position of the other side. It is that good-faith 
effort that afforded the group its vitality. It has survived through twenty-
five years, and continues to fill vacancies with new members. SAMED 
proved to be a model for groups of more recent origin that have 
developed all over the country. 9 
It is reasonable to ask regarding such local-level dialogues, "What 
good did it do?" The answer, so far, is probably not much-in terms of 
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli problem. However, it did as the doctors 
say, "do no harm." And it demonstrated that ordinary people can temper 
their group loyalties with an understanding of the experience of 
others-even if very different from their own. It is this ability that must 
be cultivated, I suggest, if democracy is to yield its optimum benefits. 
It is at least as important for democracy that this kind of 
understanding be cultivated at the grassroots level as in the 
chancelleries of the world. Indeed the one can be expected to affect the 
other. Senator George Mitchell once tried with limited, if any, success 
to help the Palestinians and Israelis move toward a resolution of their 
conflict. I had occasion on his return to ask him in a one-on-one 
conversation whether he had found anyone there who understood the 
suffering of the other side. "Not one," he remarked without hesitation, 
"they are too much overwhelmed with the suffering of their own 
people." 
Had Senator Mitchell talked with common people he could 
certainly have found some who did so understand. Unfortunately, we 
have not yet developed the mechanisms of mutual exchange sufficiently 
to have learned that grassroots communication should have a very high 
priority even before conflict begins, or at least when such conflict first 
comes to the surface. To vest responsibility for conflict avoidance 
entirely in the chancelleries of the world risks that the conflicts will not 
be resolved successfully, and that disastrous results may follow from the 
failure. A combination of popular and elite opinion appears to be the 
surest way to manage conflict within, if not also between, nations. 
One important way of achieving sound policy in a democracy is by 
participation. And that participation should be informed by a full 
knowledge of the diverse considerations. When people with different 
perspectives exchange views, there is at least a chance that each will 
9. See LEN TRAUBMAN & LIBBY TRAUBMAN, JEWISH-PALESTINE LIVING ROOM 
DIALOGUE (1992), http://traubman.igc.org/global.htm. 
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learn something from the other. Dialogue can become an effective way 
of learning valid considerations on the other side of an issue. If town 
meetings no longer function, and they are an endangered species of 
government, they should be replaced by equally functional efforts. 
SAMED's history illustrates how that can be done. That its example has 
been followed elsewhere should be a source of pride and of emulation. 
SAMED's story is not at all unique within Syracuse. There are 
volunteer agencies that bring together people from different religious or 
social groups, sometimes in dialogue as in the Fellowship of 
Congregations and in Women Transcending Boundaries, 10 sometimes in 
a large organization as in the Inter-religious Council of Central New 
York and Forging Our Community's United Strength (FOCUS). 11 There 
are citizen groups that join in a covering organization called Greater 
Syracuse Works (GSW) that assists in getting jobs for those who have 
difficulty finding employment. 12 In a recent count, GSW had brought 
together nine originally separate organizations. There is a largely 
volunteer organization that teaches reading and computer skills to 
originally illiterate adults. And one could go on to list many more of 
such active groups. The community seems spontaneously to generate 
such activities. They are serious entities that are much more reminiscent 
of Tocqueville than of Sinclair Lewis's satirical Main Street. 
The value of such groups was demonstrated after 9/11. The 
Fellowship of Congregations had included in its nine members a 
mosque as well as a Catholic Church, a synagogue, and several 
Protestant denominations. They had originally formed for discussion 
and to assist in a neighborhood job locating effort. But the 
congregations had several meetings on a variety of topics with 
speakers--or with discussion among members-that encouraged the 
sharing of spiritual and practical experiences across traditional religious 
lines. 
After 9/11, members from several of the nine congregations 
arranged a meeting at the mosque. Their purpose was to assure Imam 
Kobeisi of their support for him and the mosque in a difficult time. 
They learned that there had been menacing behavior toward women 
members of the mosque on the streets of Syracuse. And they offered to 
accompany the women to ensure their safety. 
To be sure, the police were also active in that period to prevent, 
10. See WOMEN TRANSCENDING BOUNDARIES, http://www.wtb.org. 
11. See INTER-RELIGIOUS COUNCIL OF CENTRAL NEW YORK AND FORGING OUR 
COMMUNITY'S UNITED STRENGTH (FOCUS), http://focussyracuse.org. 
12. See GREATER SYRACUSE WORKS, http://graffetto.com/clients/gsw/. 
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investigate, and arrest. The courts stood ready to punish for hate crimes. 
But what emerged was a spirit in the community that was given visible 
expression, and that minimized the need for police or court action. 
Such events in the public, non-governmental sphere leads me once 
again to realize how important it is for the effective functioning of 
democracy that the community provide a base on which the law can 
depend. That dimension may well make the difference between a law 
that is seen as foreign and imposed versus a law that is understood to 
work in partnership with the community. Given the variation from 
community to community-and neighborhood to neighborhood on these 
matters-it is clear that much needs to be done to render law 
enforcement a welcomed part of the society that prides itself on the 
dream of equal justice for all. And if this society has made progress in 
that direction, it is still very uneven. 
For simple societies, as described in classic ethnography, this may 
be an easier problem because their culture tends to be homogeneous. 13 
Nation states, however, characteristically include many different 
communities typically opposing each other. 14 With ethnic, racial, 
religious, and class differences, the retention of community solidarity 
becomes problematic. All nations struggle with this problem, and in 
some the existing hostility threatens the very fabric of the society. 
Our experience in America provides examples of both types. The 
Civil War offers a clear example, perhaps the most blatant and 
damaging in our history, in which compromise satisfactory to both sides 
received neither elite nor popular support. The human and material costs 
of the Civil War were enormous, and the War left in its wake bitterness 
that continues to manifest itself despite noble efforts to work our way 
out of it. 
By contrast, the Founders of the nation did find many ways to 
resolve difficult conflicts. The famous Connecticut Compromise, when 
the Constitution was drafted in Philadelphia, is noteworthy for 
creatively compromising the representational differences between large 
and small states through the two houses of Congress. It should be noted 
that the Constitution was ratified only after nine of the thirteen states 
voted for its acceptance. That arrangement also encouraged the 
13. See, e.g., BRONISLA w MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS AND THEIR MAGIC: A STUDY 
OF THE METHODS OF TILLING THE SOIL AND OF AGRICULTURAL RITES IN THE TROBRIAND 
ISLANDS (Routledge 2001) (1935); see also BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM 
IN SA v AGE SOCIETY (Routledge 2001) ( 1926). 
14. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES (2002) (for a general discussion of how 
state-nations become nation states). 
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publication of the Federalist papers, as well as the opposition Anti-
Federalist papers, to explain in detail to the voters the reasons for, and 
against, the proposed Constitution. 
If the American experience is to be used as a model for democratic 
governance elsewhere, we must look first to the adequacy with which 
we combine popular and elite forces. My impression is that we have an 
important reform job ahead of us. As the world becomes more complex, 
we must find ways to better inform the public of the facts and analyses 
that are needed to keep up with events. Without such information, the 
idea of democracy can be turned into a mere slogan, lacking the shared 
meaning, the democratic culture, that we have come to cherish. Our 
democratic institutions can only function well if we have a public that is 
well informed and active in initiating, choosing, and supporting 
policies. 
The dynamics of American society surely has an effect on the law, 
not only as made in the legislature and carried out by the executive, but 
also as interpreted (if not made) by the courts. In some ways, difficult to 
describe definitively, the processes of life at the local level do affect the 
governing institutions of the society. The habits of authority or 
accommodation are formed and manifested by what goes on in our 
communities. 
A COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS 
The Conference was conceived after 9/11 and motivated by the 
idea that terrorism might best be abated through the spread of 
democracy and a rule of law in many if not all countries. The premise 
that worldwide democracy will reduce the danger of terrorism cannot be 
confirmed, but a good argument can be made for it. With the spread of 
democracy and the rule of law, it is reasonable to expect that the answer 
to that question will become clearer. 
There are indications, at all events, that rule-of-law democracy has 
taken hold in many countries during the past sixty years. Lawrence 
Friedman spells out in this Journal, three routes to democracy-all of 
which have been followed during this period. When we reflect on the 
many examples of nation states converting to democracy, it is tempting 
to suggest that we might be living at the beginning of a worldwide 
democratic revolution. 
Ideas do sometimes revolutionize human thinking. That was the 
history of the Scientific Revolution that began in the sixteenth century 
and has become the standard way of studying physical, chemical, and 
biological phenomena. What began as suspect activity became widely 
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accepted as the best way of ascertaining reality. We take that change so 
for granted that we capitalize the term Scientific Revolution. 
We do not yet capitalize the term democratic revolution. Properly 
so, I would say, because the idea of democracy has not yet achieved the 
uncontested status of a widely agreed-upon preferred way of 
governance. Within a given nation state, the democratic idea can 
achieve that kind of acceptance-as it has in the United States. And the 
spread of democracy, as a governmental ideal, suggests that we might 
be on the way toward worldwide acceptance of democracy. Even so, it 
would be premature and misleading to declare a Worldwide Democratic 
Revolution. We do not know if that term will ever be justified. 
There is another important reason for caution. Democracy is an 
idea that has many different meanings. The terms Democracy and 
Republic have an emotional appeal strong enough to be used by the 
most authoritarian of governments. North Korea, for example, currently 
describes itself as the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea-although 
most observers would, by any conventional criteria, describe it as 
neither a republic nor a democracy. 
Defining the essence of democracy is not easy. One can use overt 
criteria such as choice of leaders by election, protection of rights of 
minorities and women, free circulation of information, and due process 
of law. All of these are necessary aspects of democratic governance. 
They are characteristics that tend to cluster in fully developed 
democratic systems. 
But the underlying dynamic of democracy requires clarification. 
That question has been explicitly addressed by Robert Post in a paper 
published in the Annals issue of January 2006, where many of the 
Conference papers will appear. Post's thesis is that true democracy 
requires that collective will and the will of the individual citizens must 
interact with each other in determining the course of government in the 
broadest sense. 
Describing such interactions is complicated. Dependable methods 
for rigorous description have yet to be developed. So far, these 
phenomena have largely been perceived in literary terms. Democratic 
ideals have been expressed in memorable phrases like a government "of 
the people, by the people, and for the people." Compared with such 
soaring rhetoric, the language of the public-opinion pollsters seems not 
only mundane, but also lacking in the subtlety needed to describe the 
connection between individual and collective aspirations. It is this 
problem that led an experienced pollster, Daniel Yankelovich, to reflect 
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on the difficulty of reaching underlying attitudes as opposed to verbally 
stated opinion. 15 
Issues of this kind must find a place in any systematic analysis of 
democracy. Perhaps we can contribute most effectively to the spread of 
democracy not only by defining the terms, but also by devising methods 
for measuring movement in this direction. If so, the Scientific 
Revolution, and the marvelously successful achievements that followed 
from it, could become an important part of the effort to spread 
democracy. There are signs that we may be ready for such an effort. 
Studying democracy scientifically requires a kind of consensus that 
has generally eluded the social sciences. As Thomas Kuhn points out, 
the social sciences generally lack the kind of agreement on problems 
and methods that characterize the natural sciences. 16 In those fields, the 
student learns the basic theoretical ideas, the problems that currently 
call for research, and the methods by which these problems can properly 
be addressed. All of these elements, according to Kuhn, are part of 
"normal science." Taken together, they comprise what Kuhn describes 
as a paradigm. 
Can we develop a paradigm for social scientific research that meets 
Kuhn's rigorous criteria? Using his description, most theories described 
in social science as paradigms fall considerably short of his vision. As a 
discipline advances, however, it often comes closer to meeting Kuhn's 
criteria. In the field of law and society, we have made considerable 
progress in that direction. And the times may be appropriate for more 
advances of this kind. 
The advance of a field increases with the numbers of researchers 
focusing on a common set of problems, studied in different settings. The 
more such researchers can exchange information regarding their own 
studies, and the quicker they can do it, the better. In that light, it was 
very good of Dean Arterian to have supported a Conference that did just 
that. 
The people who were brought together at the Syracuse Conference 
were looking at the same subject, rule-of-law democracy, in many 
different settings. They were motivated not only by scholarly curiosity, 
but also by the hope that their work could contribute to the solution of a 
problem. That problem might be described in two sentences: What 
makes rule-of-law democracy work? What are the effects of such 
15. See generally DANIEL y ANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING 
DEMOCRACY WORK IN A COMPLEX WORLD (1991). 
16. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. University of 
Chicago Press 1970). 
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democracy for the people of a nation and for the world community? The 
articles in this Journal and in the companion issue of the Annals focus 
on these issues. The collective product, we all hope, will advance our 
ability to handle these questions effectively. 
One of the effects of reading these articles should be an awareness 
of how much territory must be covered. It would certainly be incorrect 
to claim that agreement on a paradigm for research in this field has been 
achieved. Still, these articles taken together provide good material for 
advancing both theory and method. I am encouraged to find so many of 
my colleagues in law and society, this relatively new field, interested in 
a common problem. Perhaps a next step is to explore more fully the 
methods of research that can yield findings to test emergent theory. And 
the process can work the other way as well: as testable theory develops, 
improved methods will also emerge. 
Here I want to suggest some possibilities, not fully developed in 
the Conference, but implicit in many of the papers. It is widely 
recognized that legal effectiveness depends on the sense of legitimacy 
of the system of governance. 
To understand the nature oflegitimacy, one must look to the social 
and cultural basis of the society. 
Every complex society is held together by authority and mutually 
satisfactory exchanges. Law can and does support practices that fall 
primarily under each of these headings. When either principle becomes 
overwhelmingly dominant, law can restore the balance between them-
or can give way and support the triumph of one principle over the other. 
When the authority is excessive or when the exchanges are no longer 
mutually satisfactory, law sometimes can restore balance between the 
two principles. If it fails to do so, the society can be in for trouble of 
various kinds. 
This is not the place to develop these themes in detail. Our 
deliberations at the Conference were, for the most part, dealing with law 
as it appears to vary from one society to the next. We still lack the kind 
of theory that could sum up, in a general model, the interaction of law 
and society in complex societies. 
If we see this Conference as a step in that direction, it seems 
reasonable to review the classic works that first opened up the 
relationship between law and society. Each of the participant disciplines 
starts with some fundamental ideas that can help toward a general 
theory. In my field, sociology oflaw, we properly go back to the classic 
writers already mentioned. Accordingly, I think it worthwhile to discuss 
briefly the contribution of these sociologists to the general mix of socio-
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legal ideas. 
Sociology of law was conceived in the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth century, and it has developed in the intervening years. Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber made crucial contributions to the field, each 
of them included in their publications a major treatise devoted to law: 
Durkheim in his Division of Labor in Society; 17 Weber within the 
corpus of his Economy and Society. 18 
While these works merit close attention, credit for naming the field 
belongs to Eugen Ehrlich, a legal scholar working before World War I 
in Czemowitz, in the eastern reaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Ehrlich not only introduced the term, 19 he also gave a definition which 
he declared was "the substance of every attempt to state the 
fundamental principles of the sociology of law."20 Ehrlich's definition 
was this: 
At present, as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal 
development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in 
judicial decision, but in society itself. 21 
For Ehrlich, this definition provided a basis for his concept of "the 
living law" which he located within the structures of society. 22 In each 
institution, there develops a set of standards that Ehrlich called "the 
inner order" of the association. 23 It is these inner orders, taken together, 
that comprise the living law. This living law, he maintained, is not 
dependent on the state. Indeed, he argued, the living law exists in 
societies that do not have a state. It is with the rise of a state, Ehrlich 
maintained, that state law can come to diverge from the living law. Such 
divergence he saw as a source of difficulty when the positive law of the 
state interferes with the living law. 
Ehrlich's formulation provides a rationale for asking several 
17. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free 
Press 1984)(1893). 
18. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY, 
VOL. I & II (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fishchoff, Hans Gerth, A.M. 
Henderson, Ferinand Kolegar, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, Guenther 
Roth, Edward Shils & Claus Wittich trans. 1978). 
19. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L. 
Moll, trans., 1936). 
20. Id. at XV. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 486-506. 
23. Id. at 341-65. 
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interrelated questions: 
1. Why does state law develop? 
2. What are its distinctive characteristics? 
3. How is its content affected by the culture and social structure of the 
society? 
4. To what extent can law effect change in society? 
5. As these questions are partially answered, what can be inferred 
concerning future socio-legal developments?24 
In writings before and after Ehrlich, many scholars have addressed 
these questions in whole or in part. 25 Indeed the recent literature has 
shown remarkable profusion as scholars in every social science have 
turned their attention to the social study of law. Current work builds, as 
it must, on important works going back to formative years of sociology. 
In those formative years, leading scholars sought perspective on 
the society around them by drawing the contrast between simple and 
complex societies. Anthropological treatises in particular suggested this 
kind of contrast, and conceptual comparisons were impressively 
provided by such comparative sociologists as August Comte, 26 
Ferdinand Tonnies,27 and Herbert Spencer.28 Their speculations 
provided a background for work on legal institutions, but did not focus 
on law as a distinct institutional entity. Nor did the earlier work of 
Montesquieu29 or Maine, 30 both extremely valuable, provide the 
intellectual beginnings of sociology of law. For this beginning, credit 
must be accorded to Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The work that 
followed theirs was invariably affected by their perspectives. 
24. See generally EHRLICH, supra note 19. 
25. See THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI, MIRROR OF JUSTICE, LITERARY REFLECTIONS OF LEGAL 
CRISES ( 1997). 
26. See generally AUGUSTE COMTE, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 
(Harriet Martineau, trans., AMS Press 1974) (1855). 
27. See generally FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY ( 1957). 
28. See generally HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY (Authorized ed., 
London, Appleton 1896). 
29. See generally CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT DE LA BREDE ET MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF LA ws (Anne E . Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone trans., 
Cambridge University Press 1989) (1748). 
30. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Henry Holt & Co. 1864) 
(1861). 
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These two scholars addressed the problem that had intrigued 
others, that lies at the core of sociological inquiry: the problem of social 
solidarity or what holds society together. They also had in common the 
method of contrasting simple with complex societies. They differed, 
however, in the answers that they found in the contrast. 
EMILE DURKHEIM 
In his Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim found the answer in 
two contrasting mechanisms of social solidarity: mechanical and 
organic.31 Mechanical solidarity held people together in a society where 
all were similar in heredity, appearance, and culture. While there was a 
simple division of labor (as between men and women), the common 
understandings and experiences they shared led them to judge proper 
conduct in a broad consensus. Thus, if a member of the tribe acted 
counter to these standards, they would have incurred the anger of the 
whole group. The punitive sanctions that followed, Durkheim 
contended, reflected that anger and reinforced mechanical solidarity.32 
By contrast, said Durkheim, such common standards erode as 
society becomes more diverse. With the division of labor, in particular, 
members of a complex society have different experiences-leading 
them to have different standards or to suffer anomie. That does not 
mean that the society falls apart. It does, however, require a different 
way of explaining why it stays together. That explanation is to be found, 
he tells us, in the very diversity that undermines the mechanical basis of 
solidarity. If people are that different from each other, are they not 
likely to have different ideas of what is right? 
The answer Durkheim gives is to the effect that a different basis 
of social order, which he calls organic solidarity, emerges to take the 
place of mechanical solidarity. It is precisely the opposite of the 
mechanical principle. Organic solidarity arises from the differences that 
people have-which create the potential for people benefiting from 
what they can do for each other. The term "organic" arises from the 
analogy of the human body, in which differentiated organs each 
contribute something different to the general functioning of the body-
an idea found in the earlier work of Herbert Spencer, but here pressed to 
31. See DURKHEIM, supra note 17. 
32. Compare Richard E.D. Schwartz & James C. Miller, Legal Evolution and Societal 
Complexity 70 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 159-69 (1964); and Richard E.D. Schwartz, Legal 
Evolution and the Durkheim Hypothesis: A Reply to Professor Baxi, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV. 
653-68 (1974); and Upendra Baxi, Durkheim and Legal Evolution: Some Problems of 
Disproof, 8 LAW AND Soc'YREV. 645 (1974). 
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a different use. 
In using the concepts of solidarity, with the two specified types, 
Durkheim acknowledges that he has no direct way of measuring this 
hypothetical construct. Committed as he is to empirical methods to test 
theory, he searches for an observable indicator that can substantiate his 
theory. The indicator he comes up with-and this is where he uses law 
most creatively-is to assert that the type of legal sanction most used in 
these different societies overtly expresses the different types of 
solidarity. 
In a simple society, Durkheim expects that the prevailing mode 
of sanction to be directed against wrongdoers will be repressive and 
punitive. Thus, he reasons that the prevailing sanction in such societies 
will be punitive, designed to inflict pain on the miscreant and to deter 
others who might stray from the commonly accepted standard. 
Although his assumptions about simple societies have been debated, his 
basic quest-toward explaining law as a product of society and 
culture-remains central to sociology of law. 
In complex societies, Durkheim reasons, individuals depend on 
what they can do for each other in the kind of exchanges that Adam 
Smith and many subsequent economists have placed at the very core of 
their discipline. 33 That being the case, Durkheim looks to the exchanges 
that people make and uses them as evidence of reciprocity. In his 
original formulation, Durkheim sees contract as an important device 
that expresses the commitment to reciprocal exchange. Yet he has 
reservations as to whether the power of the state is an adequate device 
for maintaining reciprocity. Here is how he puts his concerns: 
[Contract] law's sole purpose is to ensure the regular cooperation of 
functions that enter into relationships .... But in order to achieve this 
result, it is not enough for the public authority to ensure that 
undertakings entered into are kept. It must at least in roughly the 
average number of cases, see that they are spontaneously kept. If 
contracts were only observed by force or the fear of force, contractual 
solidarity would be in an extremely parlous state.34 
Doubtful that the state can carry such a burden and concerned lest 
tyrannical rule might result were the state charged with responsibility 
33. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (P.F. Collier & Son 1902) 
(1776). 
34. See DURKHEIM, supra note 17 at 316-17. 
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for enforcing many broken contracts, Durkheim seeks another solution. 
In the preface to the second edition of Division of Labor, he urges that 
serious consideration be given to the reestablishment of guilds of a type 
known in Rome and in medieval times. 35 By this device, he hopes that 
workers could make orderly progress from apprentice to journeyman, to 
master craftsman. This is one way, he suggests, that might fulfill the 
need for social ordering for want of which complex societies suffer 
from normlessness or anomie. (In a later book, Suicide, he gives 
evidence that anomie is a significant factor in precipitating suicide, 
particularly among upwardly mobile people who give up their place in 
the stratum they leave, but cannot find normative coherence in their 
newly achieved, higher class position. )36 
Having used contract law, with its principle of restitution as an 
indicator of organic solidarity, Durkheim also expresses reservations as 
to whether this legal instrument can by itself satisfactorily do the job. 
Rather, he would see changes in society that would relieve law of too 
heavy a burden of social control. In this, his position is reminiscent of 
Montesquieu who in The Spirit of the Laws urges that state criminal 
sanctions be minimal, just enough to signal state displeasure, so that 
social disapproval can deter future antisocial acts and so that the public 
will approve state action as it might well not under a more Draconian 
regime.37 
The position of Durkheim regarding complex societies runs 
parallel to that of Ehrlich. In proposing a return to the guild, Durkheim 
suggests that state law alone cannot be counted on to regulate society-
unless aided by the structure of society. Ehrlich differs from Durkheim, 
in that Ehrlich does not call for social changes. But the two writers have 
in common that they both urge a harmonization of relations between 
state law and social structure or, in Ehrlich's phrase, the inner order of 
associations. 
MAX WEBER 
The contributions of Max Weber also focused on the problem of 
order in complex societies. His focus, however, was on the structure of 
legal institutions. Weber began his scholarly career, as a prelude to 
teaching at the University of Berlin, with a monograph on the effects of 
35. See generally id. 
36. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (George Simpson 
ed., John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans., 1951 ). 
37. See generally MONTESQUIEU, supra note 29. 
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Roman agrarian history on the development of Roman law.38 Fascinated 
with the historical development of W estem European economy and 
society, he did try to explain why capitalism distinctively occurred in 
W estem Europe. In his best known work, The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, he gives a fascinating account of how Protestant-
especially Calvinist-religion promoted in-the-world asceticism, 
providing a moral sanction for entrepreneurial activity. 39 
Weber's interest in law, however, soon took the form of describing 
at length its formal properties. To him, a formal, "bureaucratic-legal," 
system of government was the only way that complex societies could 
maintain order. Custom might do for simple societies, and religion-
based systems could suffice for Chinese, Hindu, or Islamic societies 
according to Weber. But these could not, in Weber's view, sustain the 
complex economies nor suffice as mechanisms of control for the 
complex societies of the West. Starting with the Roman Empire and its 
efforts to provide a law that could cover the nations it dominated and 
generate a natural law to cover them all, law in the West, Weber 
maintained, depended for its acceptance on its formal rationality, i.e., its 
predictability. This was achieved by the allocation of fixed and official 
jurisdictional areas, ordered by explicit rules implemented by office 
holders hierarchically organized to accept orders from above and give 
obedience from below. Formal rationality was particularly vital, he 
maintained, in providing the legal base for a complex, capitalist 
economy. 
Intrigued with this notion, Weber struggled to understand a glaring 
paradox: the common law. According to Weber, the system of judge-
made law developed in the English courts would not have been 
expected to engender the kind of predictability that he considered vital 
for rational economic activity. The paradox of successful English 
capitalism might have been explained by Weber in terms of English 
imperialism, but he did not carry his analysis to that extreme. There 
were additional reasons for the English to accord legitimacy to their 
legal system, but Weber did not get to them in a way that explained this 
exception to the satisfaction of subsequent scholars. 
Working with the continental model, Weber did not emphasize the 
differentiation between legal and bureaucratic, treating them instead as a 
38. See MAX WEBER, DIE ROMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG FOR DAS 
STAATS-UND PRIVATRECHT (ROMAN AGRARIAN HISTORY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE LAW (1891)). 
39. See MAX WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott 
Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1930). 
19
Schwartz: Community and Democracy: Syracuse Reflections
Published by SURFACE, 2005
26 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 33:7 
substantially similar and integrated decision-making system. 
Subsequent analyses have suggested the separability of the two systems. 
In the American case, with the separation of powers between the 
executive and the judicial branch, this division has become more 
obvious-and it has often been treated as a distinguishing characteristic 
of the U.S. legal system. Since this system has been the subject of much 
work, there is a tendency of American socio-legal scholars to treat law 
and legal organization as a separate institution--connected closely with 
the polity and the administrative branches, but following its own 
distinctive characteristics. That trend is also evident in the work of 
Niklas Luhmann, the German sociologist, whose Sociological Theory of 
Law treats the law as a distinct and virtually impenetrable subsystem of 
society.40 
Weber's analysis did focus on a crucial question: the legitimacy of 
governmental authority in complex societies. The answer he gave, 
however, concentrated almost exclusively on the governmental 
institutions of complex societies as he knew them. What Weber 
generally left out, as James S. Coleman pointed out in an analysis of 
The Protestant Ethic, was the impact of the bureaucratic-legal system 
on the people governed by it.41 Even assuming that legal-governmental 
orders are created by elites, modem societies do depend over time on 
the consent of the governed. In Weber's own thinking, governmental 
authority depends on acceptance by the populace. It is that acceptance 
that turns power into authority, people thus obeying the legal regime 
because they accept it as legitimate. Weber implied-perhaps even 
asserted-that well-organized bureaucratic-legal authority would be 
accepted as legitimate in complex societies. 
What a wonderful debate might have taken place between Weber 
and Durkheim! They could undoubtedly have refined their views far 
beyond what I have been able to present. But their basic point of view, I 
believe would have remained the same. Neither seems likely to have 
yielded much to the other's principle. 
The task of synthesizing these opposing views falls to this 
generation-and beyond. Societies will develop legal structures that 
emphasize authority or social exchange. But both of these principles 
will surely be operative in a well functioning legal system. Law cannot 
determine, but it can guide, the society when such fundamental matters 
40. Eee NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed., 
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985) (1972). 
41 . See James S. Coleman, Social Theory, Social Research, and Theory of Action, 91 
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1309-35 (1986). 
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enter the legal system. Equally, law in a democracy can and must be 
guided by the society. The success of law surely depends on the 
resolution of such conflicts, sufficiently to prevent them from ripping 
the society apart. To that end, those who would rationally plan to 
promote democracy in other countries can learn that the task is never 
easy and never ending. The American experience does not tell how to 
deal effectively with this problem, and other nations that look to us for 
answers will come to see that. But we have made a start in some of our 
communities, and I count Syracuse as a place that has demonstrated 
how to build, sustain, and use a public that can support a legitimate 
formal authority by cultivating the grass roots from which community 
grows. 
For all we know, the development of community culture in places 
like Syracuse, as well as in the community of socio-legal scholars, 
might be the crucial determinant of democracy and rule of law 
worldwide. I am proud to have been a part of both of these 
communities. 
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